How quickly they forget the dangers

Quite so. But then why is he so reticent about taking the election debate on Europe beyond the single currency issue? As the Amsterdam Summit approaches, moving Maastricht forward, most European states are forging ahead with a programme geared towards unifying Europe's security policy. The Franco-German plan for an EU defence arm with a military capacity has been backed by a substantial coalition of governments, along with extended majority voting, in an effort to release the EU from the paralysis in decision-making which has plagued its progress in recent years.

As an Italian-led military force moves into Albania, it is possible that events may again overtake Europe's institutional capacity to handle them, and sitting on the fence is hardly

a tenable position. Europe

cannot afford another major Balkans conflict. If the EU

fails to develop a cohesive structure to meet new regional challenges, hopes of further political integration may be wrecked, and European security jeopardised. Continuing unrest in Albania, and unfinished business in former Yugoslavia, spell out the urgent need for such a structure. Yet despite Britain's political and military involvement in the region, with nearly 6000 troops still in Bosnia, the British electorate has not been informed of the main parties' position on Britain's role in Europe's common foreign and security policy. And here, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, has been no less shy than his Tory counterpart.

The lessons of 1991, it seems, have still to be learnt. That summer, six months before the war in former Yugoslavia reached Bosnia, the Dutch EC Presidency proposed that an interpositionary force of up to 30,000 troops be sent to Croatia to restore peace. Such action would have demonstrated that the flagrant violation of international law would not be

tolerated. But the proposal, despite the backing of major European powers, was defeated at the Council of Ministers, in a consensus led by Douglas Hurd, then Foreign Secretary, (ref: Hansard, 14.10.1991, c.47). Belgrade got the message, and a full-scale land, sea, and air attack across Croatia, by the Serb-led Yugoslav National Army, ensued. It is possible that, had a structure such as now envisaged been in place, the war might not have spread.

The internal dynamics of Albania's crisis are altogether different from those in

former Yugoslavia. None the less, leaving it to individual states, which may not all be

acting from entirely disinterested motives, could be a dangerous strategy. There is a slim chance that Albania will yet

re-establish its peace through the democratic process. On the other hand, if it implodes, neighbouring states could enter the fray, with potentially devastating consequences.

A gamut of scenarios present themselves. Greece has long had claims on southern Albania (Northern Epirus, to the Greeks), where a substantial Greek minority has enjoyed a relatively privileged position. In April 1994, an attack by

ethnic Greek paramilitaries on an Albanian army post near Gjirokastra resulted in a sharp deterioration in Greek/Albanian relations.

Then there is Macedonia where students have staged hunger strikes and demonstrations in which the Albanian minority was wished ''to the gas chambers''. Should the unrest spill over to Macedonia, the Macedonian government might call on Serbia for assistance in restoring control. This would provide Serbian President Milosevic with the distraction he badly needs to deflect attention from his own precarious political position, following his massive defeat

at the recent regional elections, while extending his influence in Macedonia (historically viewed by Serbs as ''southern Serbia''), and even Albania, if that territory came up for grabs. Concomitant

turbulence in Kosovo would permit Milosevic to re-enact his role as ''saviour of the Serbs''. He may even succeed in securing another invitation from the international community to mediate in a wider regional conflict!

The Orthodo axis, stretching from Athens, through Buch-arest and Belgrade to Moscow, should also not be underestimated. Greece may not be brazen or foolhardy enough to indulge single-handedly its territorial aspirations in Albania, for fear of reprisals from Turkey. However, with the tacit backing of Russia, together with Serbia, Greece may well become more emboldened in the pursuit of restoring some of its lost Hellenic empire. Cyprus could also have a role here. A repository, since 1991, for Yugoslav capital which purportedly props up the Milosevic regime, Cyprus has recently ordered extensive Russian military equipment, to the consternation of Turkey.

A worst-case scenario would be a conflict between the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, sucking in America and Russia. Fully united, however, Europe could muster the military might, offer economic incentive, and assert the necessary political authority to prevent flashpoints from becoming wars. Britain has a significant role here. Some experts assert that Britain cannot be sidelined in Europe on defence as it can on the single currency.

This misses the point. As a European military power, with a permanent seat on the Security Council, Britain could, within the European Union, make a contribution to the maintenance of peace.

The choice is simple. In the absence of a united front to enable it to meet new challenges, and resolve those still festering, Europe will continue as a patchwork of disparate and often divergent nation states, shaping policy on the hoof. In which case, the century could end much as it began - with a couple of Balkan wars, followed by a larger conflagration. Surely this is an issue serious enough to debate in the British election campaign?

n Carole Hodge is co-author of A Test for Europe: Confidence Building in former Yugoslavia.