The journey to privatisation

and possibly unworkable formula, with the track coming under different

ownership from the services. Nevertheless, if there is going to be

privatisation -- and there obviously is, unless the Government fails to

last the full term -- then it had better be done as efficiently as

possible. By this we mean the privatised network should be efficient not

just in the sense of cost-effectiveness but also in the old-fashioned

sense of giving a satisfactory service to users. For these reasons we

welcome the appointment of Mr Chris Green to lead ScotRail into the

private sector. This means not only that he will be in charge during the

''shadow franchise'' period next year, which is supposed to give

potential bidders a basis on which to work, but also that he will lead

the expected management buy-out bid for the network. This he is well

qualified to do, to judge by his record as ScotRail general manager in

the mid-1980s, when his energy and determination created a very

favourable public impression. He and his probable deputy, Mr Alexander

Lynch, have the makings of a highly effective team with the right kind

of hands-on experience to make a credible buy-out bid. As ScotRail's

present depute director and financial controller Mr Lynch has been

working for some months on the preparations for privatisation --

apparently to free the current director, Mr Cyril Bleasdale, to

concentrate on a study of the accounts. The Green-Lynch team should

therefore hit the ground running and be in an advantageous position to

bid for the franchise when the time comes.

They will not have much time in which to show their paces, however.

The shadow franchise period is to be six months only -- from April till

October, 1994 -- compared with the expected period of one year. It would

seem that the Government wants to have the sale over well before the

next General Election -- a political consideration, but since the

privatisation scheme is itself politically motivated there may be a

certain logic to that thinking. The new team will also operate under

other constraints. Mr Green demonstrates commendably positive thinking

when he says that the network that he helped to rebuild in the 1980s has

a good chance of succeeding in the new world; but it might have a better

chance if the services were to remain under the same control as the

track and infrastructure. Their separation must make coherent planning

extremely difficult.

Not least, there is the question of funding, which is obviously

outwith the control of the ScotRail management. Potential investors in

the privatised British Rail have been told to expect returns of at least

30%, which could hardly be achieved purely by the improved marketing

that the Government cites as the potential source of the profit. The

only other possible sources are subsidy increases, higher fares, and

redundancies, and the Government's record gives a pointer to which

permutation to expect. Recent investment levels, which compare miserably

with continental countries, must cast doubt over the Government's future

intentions, despite the Transport Secretary's assurances that uneconomic

Highland lines will be kept open. The Government's preference for a

private-funding formula for the vital west coast line to London can only

add to the doubts. All this is bound to make life more difficult for the

new ScotRail team, but it ought to spell out its own commitments as far

as possible and as soon as possible. While we consider the journey to

privatisation unnecessary, we still hope that the train stays on the

rails.